Lengthy Handwritten Teshuva by Rabbi Akiva Sofer, Av Beis...
Important Teshuva by Rabbi Akiva Sofer, Av Beis Din of Pressburg and Author of Daas Sofer – Pressburg, 1926
*
A lengthy handwritten teshuva containing an in-depth halachic discussion on the question of reading the megillah on Shabbos, written by the gaon Rabbi Akiva Sofer, Av Beis Din of Pressburg, author of Daas Sofer.
Rabbi Akiva Sofer, Av Beis Din of Pressburg and author of Daas Sofer
(1878–1960), was the last to carry forward the illustrious Sofer dynasty as Rav and Rosh Yeshiva of the great Pressburg yeshiva, continuing the legacy of the Chasam Sofer, Ksav Sofer, and Shevet Sofer. Already in his youth, he began delivering shiurim in the yeshiva, and from 1907, he succeeded his father as Rav of the city. In 1940, he settled in Jerusalem, where he reestablished the renowned Pressburg yeshiva. Among his major works are Shu"t Daas Sofer on the four sections of the Shulchan Aruch and Daas Sofer on the Torah and Yamim Tovim.
Sent to his disciple, Rabbi Yosef Eliezer Miller Hy”d, who later served as dayan in Sopron (see Chasam Sofer U'Talmidav, p. 641).
Published in Shu”t Daas Sofer, Orach Chaim, siman 124. The present manuscript contains numerous variations and additions not found in the printed version. The final two passages on the third page were omitted entirely from the published teshuva.
Pressburg, 1926.
Page Count: One large folded leaf (21 × 34 cm), comprising two full written pages and part of a third page.
Condition: Good.
_________________________
Transcription of the Letter:
B”H. Pressburg, 2 Cheshva, acccording to the year "Ben Porat Yosef"
“And Hashem was with Yosef” — to my honored and beloved student and dear friend, the distinguished Rav and Torah scholar, brilliant and thoroughly versed, whose learning is pure and refined, and who is crowned with admirable and precious qualities, our teacher Rabbi Yosef Eliezer Miller, נ"י, who dwells among the scholars of the holy community of Edenburg,
After lovingly inquiring after your welfare and extending greetings:
Your letter reached me, and I saw that you expressed surprise at the words of the Pnei Yehoshua in Megillah, leaf 4, regarding Tosafos, beginning with the words “L’Rabbi Yosef.” He explains there that the reason Rabbi Yosef gives a new reason regarding the Megillah — because the eyes of the poor are raised in anticipation of the Megillah reading — rather than adopting Rabbah’s reason, that we are concerned lest one carry it, is because Rabbi Yosef maintains that only with regard to shofar and lulav are we concerned that one might carry it. A person might mistakenly rule that carrying is permitted because these mitzvos override Shabbos, just as, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the preparations necessary for shofar and lulav override Shabbos. With Megillah, however, everyone knows that the entire obligation is only Rabbinic, and one would therefore not mistakenly think that it overrides Shabbos. Rabbi Yosef therefore gives the new reason that the eyes of the poor are raised in anticipation of the Megillah reading. See there.
Your difficulty is that with a lulav, once a person has lifted it he has already fulfilled the Torah obligation. Thus, if he subsequently carries it four amos in a public domain in order to go to an expert to learn the proper movements and the bracha, this concerns only a Rabbinic requirement. He should therefore not mistakenly rule that carrying is permitted for the sake of a Rabbinic mitzvah. According to the Pnei Yehoshua’s explanation, then, Rabbi Yosef’s position is difficult: if Rabbi Yosef is not concerned that one will make such a mistake regarding the Rabbinic mitzvah of Megillah, the remaining aspects of lulav are likewise Rabbinic, yet there he necessarily accepts Rabbah’s reason. This is the substance of your question.
In fact, you have already been preceded in raising this point by the Shu”t Ksav Sofer, Orach Chaim §69, and likewise the Shu”t Shevet Sofer, Orach Chaim §34. They write that since the movements of the lulav are Rabbinic, there should be no concern that one will mistakenly rule in this manner. See there. We must therefore explain the words of the Pnei Yehoshua somewhat narrowly: since we are dealing with a complete am ha’aretz, he may assume that the movements are themselves part of the essential mitzvah and will not know how to distinguish between the movements and the primary mitzvah. This is unlike Megillah, whose entire obligation is Rabbinic. See also the Chasam Sofer on Perek Lulav HaGazul, leaf 42, beginning with the words “Mid’agbeih nafak bei.” See there.
Since I know how dear our Torah discussions have been to you ever since you served me as a student, I will present to you something I said on Shabbasa D’Rigla, resolving the words of the Rambam in accordance with the above-mentioned words of the Pnei Yehoshua.
The Rambam writes in Chapter 2 of Hilchos Shofar:
“Although sounding the shofar is prohibited as a shevus, strictly speaking it should have been sounded, for a Torah commandment should come and override a Rabbinic shevus. Why, then, is it not sounded? It is a decree lest one take it in his hand and bring it to someone who can sound it for him, and thereby carry it four amos in a public domain, or carry it from one domain to another, and thus come to transgress a prohibition.”
Here the Rambam writes that perhaps one will carry it from one domain to another, implying that the concern is not specifically that he may carry it four amos, but that we are also concerned that he may carry it from a private domain into a public domain.
Yet in Chapter 7 of Hilchos Lulav, halacha 13, he writes that a lulav is not taken because of the decree that perhaps one will carry it four amos in a public domain. He does not write, as he does regarding shofar, that perhaps one will carry it from one domain to another.
The wording of the Rambam also deserves careful attention. In Hilchos Shofar he first states, “Although sounding the shofar is prohibited as a shevus, ” whereas in Hilchos Lulav he does not first state that although taking a lulav involves the prohibition of muktzeh and carrying, strictly speaking it should nevertheless be permitted because the mitzvah of lulav overrides the prohibition of carrying. This is indeed the Gemara’s question in Sukkah: “Why? It is merely carrying!” Why, then, does the Rambam not give this introduction regarding lulav as well? What distinction is there between shofar and lulav?
To resolve all of this, it appears to me, with Hashem’s help, as follows.
The Pnei Yehoshua writes that we are concerned that a person might mistakenly rule that carrying is permitted because lulav is a Torah obligation. He might reason that just as, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the preparations for shofar and lulav override Shabbos, so too the mitzvah of lulav overrides the prohibition against carrying.
The Ksav Sofer, Orach Chaim §69, already notes a difficulty with the Pnei Yehoshua: it is difficult to say that an am ha’aretz would make a halachic error and assume the position of Rabbi Eliezer, that the preparations for shofar override Shabbos. He therefore explains that throughout the year it is forbidden to sound a shofar on Shabbos because of the Rabbinic prohibition of shevus. If a person sees that on Rosh Hashanah it is permitted to sound the shofar on Shabbos, he may reason that just as it is permitted to sound it, so too it is permitted to carry it. Being an am ha’aretz, he will not understand that sounding the shofar was permitted because it involves only a shevus, whereas carrying is a Torah prohibition. This may lead him mistakenly to desecrate Shabbos. See there.
If, as the Pnei Yehoshua says, we are concerned that he may make an error in halacha, then we must also be concerned that he may carry the shofar from a private domain into a public domain. He may mistakenly reason that just as the prohibition against sounding the shofar was permitted, carrying it out is likewise permitted. This is why the Rambam writes that we are also concerned that he may carry it from one domain to another.
The Kapos Temarim, however, resolves Tosafos’ difficulty as to why Rabbah did not say that the decree was lest one carry it out from a private domain into a public domain. He explains that the prohibition against carrying from a private domain into a public domain is explicit in Scripture — derived either from “Let no man go out from his place, ” interpreted as “let no man carry out, ” or from “and the people ceased from bringing.” A person therefore knows that this is prohibited. Carrying four amos in a public domain, however, is known only through a halacha transmitted to Moshe at Sinai. An am ha’aretz will not know this tradition, and therefore we are concerned specifically that he might carry it four amos. See there.
According to the Pnei Yehoshua, as explained by the Ksav Sofer, we may say that even regarding the prohibition against carrying out, a person could make a halachic error and think it permitted. He may reason that the mitzvah of shofar overrides the prohibition against carrying out just as it overrides the prohibition against sounding the shofar. Thus, regarding shofar we are concerned that he may also carry it out because of a mistaken halachic ruling. As for carrying four amos in a public domain, there is an independent concern: he may simply think that carrying four amos is permitted on Shabbos, since he does not know the tradition transmitted as a halacha to Moshe at Sinai that it is prohibited.
All this applies to shofar. Regarding lulav, however, it appears to me that we cannot say that he will make the same halachic error as with shofar. The only concern is that he may carry it four amos because he does not know the halacha transmitted to Moshe at Sinai. I will explain.
The Gemara in Sukkah asks, “Why? It is merely carrying! Let it override Shabbos.” Tosafos write that although the lulav is fit for use in a mitzvah, it nevertheless remains...
Important Teshuva by Rabbi Akiva Sofer, Av Beis Din of Pressburg and Author of Daas Sofer – Pressburg, 1926
*
A lengthy handwritten teshuva containing an in-depth halachic discussion on the question of reading the megillah on Shabbos, written by the gaon Rabbi Akiva Sofer, Av Beis Din of Pressburg, author of Daas Sofer.
Rabbi Akiva Sofer, Av Beis Din of Pressburg and author of Daas Sofer
(1878–1960), was the last to carry forward the illustrious Sofer dynasty as Rav and Rosh Yeshiva of the great Pressburg yeshiva, continuing the legacy of the Chasam Sofer, Ksav Sofer, and Shevet Sofer. Already in his youth, he began delivering shiurim in the yeshiva, and from 1907, he succeeded his father as Rav of the city. In 1940, he settled in Jerusalem, where he reestablished the renowned Pressburg yeshiva. Among his major works are Shu"t Daas Sofer on the four sections of the Shulchan Aruch and Daas Sofer on the Torah and Yamim Tovim.
Sent to his disciple, Rabbi Yosef Eliezer Miller Hy”d, who later served as dayan in Sopron (see Chasam Sofer U'Talmidav, p. 641).
Published in Shu”t Daas Sofer, Orach Chaim, siman 124. The present manuscript contains numerous variations and additions not found in the printed version. The final two passages on the third page were omitted entirely from the published teshuva.
Pressburg, 1926.
Page Count: One large folded leaf (21 × 34 cm), comprising two full written pages and part of a third page.
Condition: Good.
_________________________
Transcription of the Letter:
B”H. Pressburg, 2 Cheshva, acccording to the year "Ben Porat Yosef"
“And Hashem was with Yosef” — to my honored and beloved student and dear friend, the distinguished Rav and Torah scholar, brilliant and thoroughly versed, whose learning is pure and refined, and who is crowned with admirable and precious qualities, our teacher Rabbi Yosef Eliezer Miller, נ"י, who dwells among the scholars of the holy community of Edenburg,
After lovingly inquiring after your welfare and extending greetings:
Your letter reached me, and I saw that you expressed surprise at the words of the Pnei Yehoshua in Megillah, leaf 4, regarding Tosafos, beginning with the words “L’Rabbi Yosef.” He explains there that the reason Rabbi Yosef gives a new reason regarding the Megillah — because the eyes of the poor are raised in anticipation of the Megillah reading — rather than adopting Rabbah’s reason, that we are concerned lest one carry it, is because Rabbi Yosef maintains that only with regard to shofar and lulav are we concerned that one might carry it. A person might mistakenly rule that carrying is permitted because these mitzvos override Shabbos, just as, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the preparations necessary for shofar and lulav override Shabbos. With Megillah, however, everyone knows that the entire obligation is only Rabbinic, and one would therefore not mistakenly think that it overrides Shabbos. Rabbi Yosef therefore gives the new reason that the eyes of the poor are raised in anticipation of the Megillah reading. See there.
Your difficulty is that with a lulav, once a person has lifted it he has already fulfilled the Torah obligation. Thus, if he subsequently carries it four amos in a public domain in order to go to an expert to learn the proper movements and the bracha, this concerns only a Rabbinic requirement. He should therefore not mistakenly rule that carrying is permitted for the sake of a Rabbinic mitzvah. According to the Pnei Yehoshua’s explanation, then, Rabbi Yosef’s position is difficult: if Rabbi Yosef is not concerned that one will make such a mistake regarding the Rabbinic mitzvah of Megillah, the remaining aspects of lulav are likewise Rabbinic, yet there he necessarily accepts Rabbah’s reason. This is the substance of your question.
In fact, you have already been preceded in raising this point by the Shu”t Ksav Sofer, Orach Chaim §69, and likewise the Shu”t Shevet Sofer, Orach Chaim §34. They write that since the movements of the lulav are Rabbinic, there should be no concern that one will mistakenly rule in this manner. See there. We must therefore explain the words of the Pnei Yehoshua somewhat narrowly: since we are dealing with a complete am ha’aretz, he may assume that the movements are themselves part of the essential mitzvah and will not know how to distinguish between the movements and the primary mitzvah. This is unlike Megillah, whose entire obligation is Rabbinic. See also the Chasam Sofer on Perek Lulav HaGazul, leaf 42, beginning with the words “Mid’agbeih nafak bei.” See there.
Since I know how dear our Torah discussions have been to you ever since you served me as a student, I will present to you something I said on Shabbasa D’Rigla, resolving the words of the Rambam in accordance with the above-mentioned words of the Pnei Yehoshua.
The Rambam writes in Chapter 2 of Hilchos Shofar:
“Although sounding the shofar is prohibited as a shevus, strictly speaking it should have been sounded, for a Torah commandment should come and override a Rabbinic shevus. Why, then, is it not sounded? It is a decree lest one take it in his hand and bring it to someone who can sound it for him, and thereby carry it four amos in a public domain, or carry it from one domain to another, and thus come to transgress a prohibition.”
Here the Rambam writes that perhaps one will carry it from one domain to another, implying that the concern is not specifically that he may carry it four amos, but that we are also concerned that he may carry it from a private domain into a public domain.
Yet in Chapter 7 of Hilchos Lulav, halacha 13, he writes that a lulav is not taken because of the decree that perhaps one will carry it four amos in a public domain. He does not write, as he does regarding shofar, that perhaps one will carry it from one domain to another.
The wording of the Rambam also deserves careful attention. In Hilchos Shofar he first states, “Although sounding the shofar is prohibited as a shevus, ” whereas in Hilchos Lulav he does not first state that although taking a lulav involves the prohibition of muktzeh and carrying, strictly speaking it should nevertheless be permitted because the mitzvah of lulav overrides the prohibition of carrying. This is indeed the Gemara’s question in Sukkah: “Why? It is merely carrying!” Why, then, does the Rambam not give this introduction regarding lulav as well? What distinction is there between shofar and lulav?
To resolve all of this, it appears to me, with Hashem’s help, as follows.
The Pnei Yehoshua writes that we are concerned that a person might mistakenly rule that carrying is permitted because lulav is a Torah obligation. He might reason that just as, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the preparations for shofar and lulav override Shabbos, so too the mitzvah of lulav overrides the prohibition against carrying.
The Ksav Sofer, Orach Chaim §69, already notes a difficulty with the Pnei Yehoshua: it is difficult to say that an am ha’aretz would make a halachic error and assume the position of Rabbi Eliezer, that the preparations for shofar override Shabbos. He therefore explains that throughout the year it is forbidden to sound a shofar on Shabbos because of the Rabbinic prohibition of shevus. If a person sees that on Rosh Hashanah it is permitted to sound the shofar on Shabbos, he may reason that just as it is permitted to sound it, so too it is permitted to carry it. Being an am ha’aretz, he will not understand that sounding the shofar was permitted because it involves only a shevus, whereas carrying is a Torah prohibition. This may lead him mistakenly to desecrate Shabbos. See there.
If, as the Pnei Yehoshua says, we are concerned that he may make an error in halacha, then we must also be concerned that he may carry the shofar from a private domain into a public domain. He may mistakenly reason that just as the prohibition against sounding the shofar was permitted, carrying it out is likewise permitted. This is why the Rambam writes that we are also concerned that he may carry it from one domain to another.
The Kapos Temarim, however, resolves Tosafos’ difficulty as to why Rabbah did not say that the decree was lest one carry it out from a private domain into a public domain. He explains that the prohibition against carrying from a private domain into a public domain is explicit in Scripture — derived either from “Let no man go out from his place, ” interpreted as “let no man carry out, ” or from “and the people ceased from bringing.” A person therefore knows that this is prohibited. Carrying four amos in a public domain, however, is known only through a halacha transmitted to Moshe at Sinai. An am ha’aretz will not know this tradition, and therefore we are concerned specifically that he might carry it four amos. See there.
According to the Pnei Yehoshua, as explained by the Ksav Sofer, we may say that even regarding the prohibition against carrying out, a person could make a halachic error and think it permitted. He may reason that the mitzvah of shofar overrides the prohibition against carrying out just as it overrides the prohibition against sounding the shofar. Thus, regarding shofar we are concerned that he may also carry it out because of a mistaken halachic ruling. As for carrying four amos in a public domain, there is an independent concern: he may simply think that carrying four amos is permitted on Shabbos, since he does not know the tradition transmitted as a halacha to Moshe at Sinai that it is prohibited.
All this applies to shofar. Regarding lulav, however, it appears to me that we cannot say that he will make the same halachic error as with shofar. The only concern is that he may carry it four amos because he does not know the halacha transmitted to Moshe at Sinai. I will explain.
The Gemara in Sukkah asks, “Why? It is merely carrying! Let it override Shabbos.” Tosafos write that although the lulav is fit for use in a mitzvah, it nevertheless remains...
